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Future naval ships will be all-electric, with an integrated power system that
combines the propulsion power system with the rest of the ship’s electrical distribution
system.

Reconfiguration of the power system will increase fight-through and

survivability of ships, but will also require the systems that support the power system,
such as the protection system, to be automatically updated to match current power system
needs. This thesis presents an adaptive relaying scheme for shipboard power systems, to
automatically modify relay settings after power system topology changes.
Multiple Groups of relay settings are predetermined and stored in the digital
relays that are protecting the power system. The active Group of settings is automatically
determined based on the open/close status of breakers and switches. The developed
protection scheme is tested on two test cases by digital simulation using CAPE software
and on one case by closed-loop simulation with RTDS and SEL-351S relays.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
1.1 All-Electric Shipboard Power Systems
Shipboard power systems are becoming more reliable, more efficient, and more
flexible. Future naval craft will have an integrated power system, which will combine the
propulsion power system with the ship’s control and accessory power system. This
power system must be very reliable to ensure the ship can maneuver and avoid or engage
other marine vessels.

Additionally, of high importance are fight through and

survivability. These terms refer to the ability of the ship to withstand damage from battle
and still have critical ship components available. This suggests that the power system
must be able to dynamically adapt or reconfigure to provide the best possible service to
all of the ship’s loads. At minimum, the power system should be able to provide energy
to the critical ship systems that are not damaged.
Shipboard power systems are different from terrestrial power systems, but there
are also some similarities.

Shipboard power systems are different since they have

insulated ground and, because of its small size, no “infinite” bus.

Similarities of

shipboard and terrestrial power system include three-phase generation, transmission, and
load. The work presented in this thesis assumes the shipboard power system is more like
a terrestrial power system in order to demonstrate the adaptive nature of a protection
system.

1

2
The DD(X) is a notional baseline model of the future all-electric ship, which
outlines the expected ship needs for the navy. The DD(X) is very useful in developing a
power system model that has characteristics of future shipboard power systems. This can
be used for studying future power system control and protection techniques.
Critical to the usefulness of the work presented in this thesis is the knowledge that
future naval shipboard power systems will be automatically reconfigurable. This means
when parts of the power system are damaged, the power system will deliberately modify
the remaining healthy parts of the power system to provide continued service. When the
power system changes, the support systems of the power system will also need to be
updated in order to properly interact with the power system.

The support systems

needing modification after reconfiguration include protection devices, compensation
equipment, and control apparatus.

1.2 Power System Protection
Power systems need relays, fuses or other types of power system protection
devices to detect and remove abnormal power system conditions as quickly as possible.
This removal of abnormal conditions will isolate faulted parts of the power system so that
the unfaulted portion can continue to serve the connected load.
Traditional relays have been electromechanically based, with moving parts that
actuate breaker tripping. They have been reliable for terrestrial power systems, but they
are limited in their flexibility to do multiple relaying functions, ability to readily change
settings, and communication to other remote devices.

3
In the past twenty years, the digital relay has gained acceptance in the industry
and is becoming very common in relaying applications. Digital relays are very flexible in
terms of the variety of relaying practices they can implement. The SEL-351S digital
relay is utilized in this thesis work. Key features used for the presented power system
protection scheme in this thesis are fault direction selectivity and the ability to store
multiple settings and activate those settings based on inputs to the relay.

1.3 Adaptive Protection For Shipboard Power Systems
This thesis outlines the process of developing a first generation adaptive
protection scheme for shipboard power systems. It also seeks to determine if this is a
viable application of adaptive protection and if the method of realizing the adaptive
protection is appropriate. The necessity of adaptive protection is demonstrated by the
need to update power system support systems as the power system changes through
reconfiguration or other means.

The SEL-351S digital relay is employed as the

protection device in this protection scheme. Development and testing of the adaptive
protection scheme is done primarily with CAPE, which is a protection engineering
software tool that has functions for fault analysis and protection testing. Additionally,
one of the two power systems used in studying the adaptive protection scheme is modeled
in RTDS (Real-Time Digital Simulator) [24] for closed-loop testing of the SEL-351S
relay and adaptive protection scheme.
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1.4 Thesis Organization
The thesis is organized by introducing the background and problem, continuing
with the development and testing of adaptive protection, and, finally, the discussion of
results and future work opportunities.

Chapter II provides background on adaptive

relaying and the DD(X) shipboard power system. Chapter III introduces the adaptive
relaying problem, offers why a solution is needed, details the power system models used,
and identifies the main tools utilized. Chapter IV describes the development of the
adaptive protection scheme for both power system models used. The chapter covers
protection scheme assumptions and expectations, fault analysis and determination of
relay settings, and testing and results of the adaptive protection scheme. Additionally,
this chapter ends with testing and results of RTDS closed-loop testing of the adaptive
protection scheme. Chapter V discusses the results from all of the testing. Finally,
Chapter VI suggests the benefits of the presented work and areas of potential future work.

CHAPTER II
BACKGROUND AND PREVIOUS WORK
2.1 Introduction
Information for shipboard electrical power systems (SEPSs) is not as plentiful as
that for the traditional land-based or terrestrial electrical power systems (TEPSs). There
are similarities and differences with both, and a comparison of the two types of systems is
most useful when describing shipboard electrical power systems.

2.2 Shipboard vs. Terrestrial Power Systems
Similarities of the SEPS and TEPS are basic and include electrical power
generation, transformers for changing electrical potential, a transmission/distribution
system, protection equipment, and loads. The differences in the two systems lie in the
specific needs of the ship. The implementation of a SEPS can be viewed as a subset of a
TEPS. For example, transmission and distribution in the land-based system utilizes both
cable and overhead lines, while the ship system utilizes cabling since there is not enough
open area on a ship to employ an exposed wire distribution system.
A ship's power plants are of a smaller scale than that of the larger land-based
power systems, though the prime movers and fuel used are similar. A major difference in
the SEPS and the TEPS is that the TEPS is a three-phase grounded system (neutral is
earthed), while the SEPS is usually a three-phase ungrounded system (neutral is floating
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or insulated). A floating neutral is used on ships to reduce outages and increase safety in
line-to-earth/ship faults [14], [19]. If a single-line-to-ground fault occurs, the ship’s
potential to neutral would be the same as the faulted phase, but no fault current would
flow since the grounded ship is not the neutral return path of the three-phase power.
The biggest transformers on ships are smaller in size and power rating than the
largest in terrestrial systems. This is a result of lower power requirements and limited
space on a ship. The traditional ac user level voltages in terrestrial power systems are
120 V, 240 V, 480 V, and up. However, ship loads have different voltage requirements.
Examples of the ac voltage levels used on US Navy ships are 440 V, 4.16 kV, 13.8 kV
and 120 V [18].
Not only will some ship loads have different voltage magnitude requirements, but
these loads can also have different frequency and power profile requirements and will
make up a larger percentage of the load than they do on a terrestrial power system [18].
One example of a different frequency requirement is the radar power system, which uses
400 Hz power. Pulse loads, such as electromechanical guns, use large amounts of power,
nearly what is needed for propulsion [20], which greatly stress the shipboard power
system. Other electronic systems are very sensitive to changes in the power system and
power quality causing reliability to be much more important on a ship.
The scales of both systems are different, leading to differences in energy delivery
terminology. In a TEPS, power is generated by large, remotely located power plants, the
voltage is then stepped up to a higher potential using power transformers and then it is
transmitted over a long distance through high voltage power lines. The high voltage and
long distance traveled, usually on overhead lines, describes “transmission.” Once the

7
power has reached the general area of its intended load, the voltage is stepped down to a
lower potential (one or multiple times) and is distributed to the nearby loads. At this
lower voltage, the electricity has a shorter distance to load and is referred to as
“distribution,” involving overhead lines as well as cables. The split from transmission to
distribution is generally associated with a voltage level. Usually, voltages less than 69
kV are considered distribution, but this varies from utility to utility. Power delivery on
the SEPS is most closely associated with distribution in the TEPS because of lower
voltages and shorter distances traveled, source to load.
To continue with the scale differences of the SEPS and the TEPS, one can look at
the basic electrical stability of the systems. Land-based systems are often very large,
both physically and electrically. In the United States, regional electric power systems are
connected with other regional power systems leading to an interconnected grid spanning
the entire USA and Canada. The benefits of such a system include the notion of an
infinite bus. It is called an infinite bus because the large number of rotating machines
(generators and motors) creates a system with a very large inertia, preventing brief
disturbances (e.g. a. line-to-ground fault) from causing the entire system to lose
synchronism and fail. Instead, normal operation can continue when disturbances are
properly isolated.
The ship system does not have the advantage of an infinite bus [18], as there are
usually two to three primary generation units and a similarly small number of backup
generators. The few, relatively small generators in the system are not significant enough
to improve the spinning reserve of the power system. Disturbances on the ship system
must be resolved quickly to decrease the chance of the entire system failing.
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Table 2.1 summarizes the similarities and differences between a TEPS and a
SEPS. A theme in Table 2.1 is the smaller size of the SEPS system. Two issues that are
significant for every piece of equipment on the ship, whether electrical or not, are the
equipment’s size and weight.

Size and weight are usually not limiting factors in

terrestrial power system planning, but are critical in shipboard power systems. Large
electrical equipment limits space for supplies and additional equipment on ships. Heavy
equipment will hinder the ship's speed/acceleration and maneuverability more drastically
than would lighter equipment.
TABLE 2.1 SUMMARY OF TERRESTRIAL AND SHIPBOARD POWER SYSTEM COMPARISON
Differences

System
Component

TEPS

SEPS

Power Plants

few size restrictions

smaller size

fuel,
technology

Transformers

few size restrictions

smaller size

-

Loads

not heavily electronic

more electronic based
and sensitive; voltage
magnitude and frequency
requirements

-

Energy
Delivery

overhead lines and
cable, all voltage levels

cable, TEPS distribution
voltage levels

-

Power System
in General

very large, grounded

small, ungrounded

3-phase

Stability

infinite bus

no infinite bus

all equipment
interconnected

Similarities

2.3 Fight-Through and Survivability
Fight-through and survivability are important concepts for military marine
vessels. Fight-through and survivability mean that when a ship is damaged, usually as a
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result of battle, it can redirect available resources to its functioning equipment to continue
an attack or take defensive action. Electrical power resources (generators and power
delivery equipment) are manipulated to avoid damaged infrastructure and deliver
electricity to the essential loads that are in operation (weaponry, propulsion motors, and
communication equipment).

2.4 Reconfiguration
A reconfigurable power system is one that contains switches that allow sections of
the power system to be rearranged to provide continuity of service. Switches, like a
breaker, may simply open because of an overcurrent or other fault condition on a line.
More complex switching involves computer controls that use complex algorithms to
monitor the power system and open and close switches to optimize energy delivery.
Reconfiguration is more complex than simply removing a faulted line. It requires
reconfiguration or updating of the systems that complement the power system. Examples
of these complementary systems include compensation equipment, relays and other
protective devices. Once the power system is reconfigured, compensation systems, such
as voltage regulators, reactive compensators and harmonic filters, may be needed more or
less and at different locations, depending on load profile changes in the system.
Similarly, equipment will not be properly protected if the protection devices are set for
the pre-reconfiguration settings. These situations may lead to more equipment being
damaged and catastrophic results due to a second fault, not as a direct result of enemy
attack.
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A specific example of updating overcurrent relays after the power system
topology changes is illustrated in Figure 2.1. Depending on which configuration, (a) or
(b), relays 1 and 2 must change direction of overcurrent sensing to view a fault and they
must also change trip delay time so that the relays are coordinated.

(a) Breaker 1 Open

(b) Breaker 2 Open
Figure 2.1 Two-bus Reconfigurable System
2.5 Protection
Protection devices are controls that attempt to limit detrimental power system
conditions, such as high currents, over/under-frequency, over/under-voltage, and reverse
power flow. Protection devices include the equipment that senses, transforms, and makes
control decisions (open/close) based on system voltages and currents. Relays are the
protection devices that control whether switches should be open or closed for the given
state of the power system.
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2.5.1 Relays
Relays are protective devices that observe a scaled version of the line voltage and
current and control whether or not the system being monitored should continue to operate
in its current state. Relays are essential for the safe and reliable operation of power
systems. For a more detailed understanding of protective relaying and power system
protection, the reader is directed to [12] and [21].
The first protective relays used in power systems were analog. They were based
on mechanical principles and had moving parts that included springs, rotors, and
solenoids. Scaled line voltages and currents were used in these relays to actuate the
moving parts. When a line current was too great or voltage was not within limits, the
mechanical parts of the relay would interact to close or open a set of contacts. This, in
turn, could affect a larger collection of different relays and result in operating a switch in
the power system.
Analog relays are still in use today, but during the past twenty years the digital
relay has become increasingly popular. Digital relays are protective devices that are
based on microprocessors for switch control. Power electronics are used to discretize the
scaled line voltage and current signals, which the microprocessor can sense and use to
implement the control algorithm. Digital relays use software to realize many different
types of analog relays and, therefore, the package of a digital relay is a fraction of the size
of the comparable analog relays.
Communication is an important benefit of digital relays. Digital relays can easily
communicate between each other across long or short distances.

The addition of

communication to protective relaying greatly increases the power of a protection scheme.
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Relays can communicate with one another to indicate failures, suppress operation, and
properly isolate a fault.
Communication is also possible between devices other than relays. Computers,
remote or local, can interface with digital relays and allow humans to easily interact with
the relay. A computer can download almost any digital aspect of the relay, including
current settings, event reports, and operation logs. Changes to relay settings can be done
on the computer, saved to a separate file for future reference, and uploaded to the relay
for desired operation.

Figure 2.2 illustrates relay-to-relay and relay-to-computer

communication paths for a digital relay.

Figure 2.2 Digital Relay Communication Paths
Adaptive relaying on shipboard power systems must be rapid in order for the
power system to be protected correctly all of the time. As the power system changes, due
to damage or planned switching, so, too, must the protection and relay settings. The
work in this document utilizes the digital relay because of its ability to quickly change
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settings, store alternate settings, and communicate to determine the status of other relays
and switches.

2.5.2 Shipboard Power System Protection
Just like terrestrial power systems, shipboard power systems have protective
devices. The previously noted differences in SEPSs and TEPSs translate into different
protection requirements for each system. In his review of electrical installations on ships
[14], D. Gray indicates that shipboard protection must emphasize power system stability
and discrimination. Stability is important because there is no infinite bus in the shipboard
power system and a fault could quickly cause the entire power system to collapse.
Discrimination should be observed because complete loss of power to critical ship
components could lead to very serious consequences.
E. J. Greer [15] also discusses the capacity vs. size of load issue, making
protection of SEPSs more complicated. Additionally, he indicates that some protection
philosophies that have been traditionally used for land-based power systems are being
applied to new naval ships in England. Examples include reverse power flow protection
and load shedding.
Since the SEPS has an insulated neutral, minimal current will flow through a
single phase-to-ground fault. However, if either of the two remaining phases were to
contact ground, a phase-to-phase fault would occur and result in high fault current and
possibly damage and widespread outages. H. L. Hess et al [17] suggest a method of
recognizing a single phase-to-ground fault so it can be isolated and removed before a
phase-to-phase fault occurs.
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H. Xiao et al [16] present a method of simulating how a ship would respond to
battle damage, i.e. physical location of blast impacts on local electrical components. This
was done by simulating and modeling a shipboard power system in the Alternate
Transients Program and a GIS/AM/FM system.
As for protective device implementation, a digital relay works well in SEPSs
because of the lack of moving parts and space-saving compact package. The moving
parts in an analog relay used in a moving ship (or non-vertical mounting) may cause false
operation of the relay and lead to system failure [10].
As suggested previously, the flexibility of a digital relay is also a benefit. One
digital relay can take the place of many different analog relays in a much smaller space.
Updating the relay functions can be as easy as installing different software.
Communication with computers and other relays aids in correctly protecting the power
system.

2.6 DD(X)
The DD(X) is a destroyer-class ship in the proposed all-electric fleet.. The Eship, as it is often called, is an all-electric ship where the electricity is produced by
traditional means and is used to power everything else on the ship. A concept drawing of
the DD(X) is shown in Figure 2.3.
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Figure 2.3 DD(X) Concept Drawing with Tumblehome Hull Form [11]
One motivation behind the DD(X) is to create a more efficient ship: less weight,
better engine and fuel utilization, and use of superconducting motors. Other motivators
include fight-through and survivability; when ships are damaged, they will have a
decreased chance of losing critical ship components.
In order to keep the power system functioning, the power system must be able to
reconfigure to isolate faulted/damaged areas and reroute paths from generation to critical
loads. Once the power system is physically reconfigured, the protection equipment and
associated support equipment must also be updated. For example, if a feeder has three
loads connected to it originally, and after reconfiguration a fourth bus with a large motor
is added, the feeder relay will have to recognize the added load and not mistake it for a
fault. A possible resolution would be to increase the trip current setting of the relay.
This updating of the relay(s) will have to be automatic, as there will be no time for an
individual to go and physically make the required changes.
The topology of the power system used in this document’s study is similar to the
conceptual DD(X) system. Specifically, simulation is ultimately carried out on a ring-bus
system, with four generators, as is in the DD(X) system. Voltages will be on the same
scale as on the DD(X) and generator parameters will be of the same type as on the
DD(X).
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2.7 Adaptive Relaying
The goal of this work is to study the concept of adaptive relaying and to
demonstrate a simple adaptive relaying scheme that can be used as a baseline technique
for reconfiguring protective devices in a power system. Adaptive relaying refers to the
updating of the power system’s relays to correctly protect the power system after it
sustains a change in topology.
An early paper by S. H. Horowitz et al [1] introduces using microprocessor-based
relays to realize adaptive relaying. Also presented is the following definition:
“Adaptive protection is a protection philosophy which
permits and seeks to make adjustments to various
protection functions in order to make them more attuned to
prevailing power system conditions.” [1]
While no algorithms were presented, S. H. Horowitz et al do present areas where
adaptive relaying can be utilized: multi-terminal transmission line protection, relay
settings, transformer protection, and automatic circuit breaker reclosing control.
In a similar article, J. D. Codling et al [2] talk about adaptive relaying and how it
can be used in the modern power system. This article indicates that the status of the
power system can change continuously and, therefore, relays must change on-line to
adapt to these changes. Types of adaptive relaying suggested in [2] are adaptive distance
protection, power transformer protection, reclosing, and under-frequency protection.
M. S. Sachdev et al [3] present a network topology determination technique that
can be used in adaptive protection.

The results of their research indicate that the

proposed technique is both accurate and fast enough to be used when updating protective
devices. The work of this paper suggests the importance of the timeliness of new power
system data for updating settings in relays.
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N. A. Laway and H. O. Gupta [4] present an algorithm that updates relays in an
on-line fashion. Specifically, adaptive protection is applied to dynamically determine
pickup current and time multiplier in overcurrent relays. These two parameters are found
through optimization techniques. Tests are done using three-phase faults because they
are the most severe of fault cases.
Past work on adaptive relaying [1]-[4] has dealt with land-based systems and little
has been done in the area of adaptive relaying on shipboard systems. Recent shipboard
power system papers [5]-[9] have focused on physical reconfiguration of the ship's power
system and not on protective device coordination. One exception is the forward-thinking
prediction made by J. M. Newell et al [13], suggesting that continuous real-time
simulations of the power system should be done to reconfigure the protection. With these
continuous real-time simulations, protection devices would be updated automatically
after the power system changes.
The lack of papers and reference documents concerning shipboard power system
adaptive relaying suggests the need for more research in this area so ships can operate in
an optimal state of system protection.

2.8 Summary
This chapter provided background on shipboard power systems, power system
protection, reconfiguration of relays, and the DD(X). Additionally, previous work in the
area of adaptive relaying was reviewed in this chapter. Lack of publications in the area
of adaptive relaying on shipboard power systems suggests that this is an area that
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warrants further study. Chapter 3 will detail the problem to be solved in this thesis and
outline the steps taken for the solution.

CHAPTER III
PROBLEM DESCRIPTION
3.1 Introduction
This thesis demonstrates the concept and development of an adaptive protection
scheme, in which the protection settings change based on the changing topology of the
power system network. The result is a baseline methodology for protecting the power
system in various circumstances and configurations, referred to as First Generation
Adaptive Protection (also referred to as “G1-AP” in this document). The steps involved
in developing the G1-AP baseline are identified and detailed in this chapter, then carried
out in later chapters. Additionally, this chapter will indicate the models used, tools used,
and assumptions made in this work.
The first part of this chapter presents the reasons for using adaptive protection,
justifying this body of work. The model of the ship power system under study and a
simplified power system are also discussed. This will include all possible power system
configurations (whether desired or not) and what assumptions have been made. Next, the
fault study performed is discussed in terms of the types of faults and the fault locations
used. The results from the fault study are used to determine the correct settings for the
relays with various system configurations.

Mapping these settings enables the

organization of the settings into several groups that can reasonably protect all of the
predetermined system configurations. To verify group settings, simulations are carried
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out to determine the effectiveness of the revised protection settings. The results from the
simulations will indicate the usefulness of G1-AP and where improvements can be made.

3.2 Why Adaptive Protection?
Adaptive protection refers to the updating of relay settings to represent a change
in power system topology. Power system topology can change for two main reasons: (1)
deliberate system switching and (2) unplanned system switching.

An example of

deliberate switching is the isolation of a piece of equipment for maintenance.

An

example of unplanned switching is a relay taking action to remove a fault from an
otherwise healthy power system.
In either case, the power system topology has changed and system protection
settings may not adequately protect the current system. This is the basis for using
adaptive protection; once the system topology has changed, system protective devices
should have their settings updated as soon as possible to protect against new faults.
Optimally, adaptive relaying should protect the power system no matter how the power
system is configured.

3.3 System Modeling
This project concerns shipboard electrical power systems, specifically the DD(X),
as noted in Chapter 2. The system modeled in this study is based mainly on details given
in [22]-[24]. The one-line diagram of this system is shown in Figure 3.1 on the following
page.
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The model used in this project is based on a shipboard electrical power system,
however, not every aspect of a SEPS is implemented. This is a consequence of the goal
of this work (demonstrating the concept of adaptive relaying) and the tools used in
simulation. The differences in the model used in simulation and a given ship system
include using a model with a grounded neutral and the concept of an infinite generation
bus, capable of delivering large currents without losing synchronism.

Figure 3.1 One-line diagram of modeled DD(X) system in CAPE
Implementing a grounded-neutral results in large currents for single-line-toground faults and the ability to apply single-phase overcurrent relaying practices.
Though not likely on a ship, single-line-to-ground overcurrent faults and associated
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protection practices provide a basic type of power system protection that can be easily
modified as the power system topology changes.
Using an infinite bus allows the study to be done without worry of the generation
that will be provided in the actual system.

In the CAPE simulation environment,

generator parameters are entered, but the system will not lose synchronism because of a
fault event. Therefore, the generators will act like infinite buses.

3.3.1 DD(X) Power System
A brief description of the DD(X) system is given in this chapter in order to
introduce the specifics of shipboard power systems. The system is a 13.8 kV loop with
two main turbine generators (MTGs) rated at 36 MW each and two auxiliary turbine
generators (ATGs) rated at 4 MW each. There are two 36.5 MW propulsion motors on
separate 4.16 kV buses. Additionally, there is the 450 V system with seven main buses,
which serve as load centers for the rest of the ship’s load. These load centers are
connected to two alternate 450 V auxiliary power units (APUs), rated at 0.5 MW each.
The physical location of the equipment is based on [23] and [24].

This

information is available primarily for the 13.8 kV system, and the placement of the 450 V
system components may not be accurate, as they were not provided. Therefore, some of
the 450 V components have assumed locations. Physical placement is important, but less
essential than equipment connections for this work. Current and past Destroyer class
naval ships were reviewed in [25] to determine practical ship measurements (500 ft x 60
ft) and approximate cable lengths.
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The cable characteristics were not available in the ship references, therefore,
characteristics of 15 kV rated cable in [26] was used for the 13.8 kV cabling. In general,
the impedance of the cable (main cable characteristic) will be small because of the short
length that the cable has to span from bus to bus, as compared to a terrestrial power
system.
Examples of loading on the ship’s power system are given in [24]. Loads will
vary based on the ship's activity, such as cruising or in battle. The different possible
DD(X) power system configurations and generator scheduling are based on information
provided in [23].

3.3.2 Model for Simulation
To demonstrate adaptive relaying, simulation was done with a power system that
resembles that of the DD(X). Namely, the simulation power system is a four-bus, fourgenerator looped system, with a load at every bus, as illustrated in Figure 3.2. This
simple system is made of two even more basic systems, two two-bus, two-generator
systems, with a load at each bus. This two-bus system is shown in Figure 3.3.
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Figure 3.2 Four-bus Power System for Simulation

Figure 3.3 Two-bus Power System
Fault analysis of the two-bus system under different scenarios (i.e. one or both
generators connected) is completed first in order to understand how the relay settings
must be updated after power system reconfiguration when not in a looped system.
Examples of these settings are fault direction, time delay, and fault current magnitude.
Once the fundamentals are understood for the two-bus system, two of these systems will
be connected in parallel to form a four-bus, looped system, as in Figure 3.2.

25
The four-bus system is more representative of the ship’s power system, as it is
looped. Multiple scenarios are possible, depending on which breakers are open or closed.
Fault analysis is performed for all of these scenarios as well.

3.4 Fault Analysis
The determination of the necessary level of protection is based on fault analysis
results. Fault analysis involves applying faults to various locations in the modeled power
system and recording the resulting currents and voltages. The three types of faults that
are applied are three-phase, phase-to-phase, and single-phase.

The assumed fault

locations will be at each bus and the midpoint of each line.
The faults are selected for specific reasons. Three-phase faults are the most
severe type of power system fault and can cause the most equipment damage. Phase-tophase faults have no ground connection. Single-phase faults are most common and, on a
grounded system, will cause significant fault currents to flow.
The results of the fault analysis are fault currents and voltages for each fault type
and location. These results are found for all possible system configurations so that
adaptive protection settings can be determined.

3.5 Determining Protection
System protection can be realized after the fault analysis is complete. Relay
settings are selected based on power system configuration and fault conditions obtained
from the fault analysis.
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The different power system topologies, along with the associated relay settings,
are tabulated and organized so that sets of relay settings for a particular relay location are
similar. This organization is done so that each group of relay settings for a specific relay
can be grouped into one of six available groups. Each group of similar relay settings will
be analyzed to find a set of common settings that can be used for that group and can
manage all situations that need to be covered. This procedure is called mapping.
The six groups of settings for each relay location will be programmed into the
corresponding relay and simulated on the shipboard power system to verify that the
settings are adequate to protect the power system for all configurations and faults. The
relay used in simulation is the SEL-351S (a digital relay), as it is the same relay at the
Mississippi State University Power Systems Laboratory. This model is available in the
simulation tool used in this project and it has satisfactory relay elements for the required
protection in this study. Figure 3.4 shows the front faceplate of the SEL-351S relay in
the Mississippi State University Power Systems Laboratory.

Figure 3.4 SEL-351S Relay at Mississippi State University
The final result will be a first generation adaptive protection scheme, where the
relay settings are preprogrammed in the relays and certain events and system
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configurations cause different groups of relay settings to be used.
determining the protection settings is illustrated in Figure 3.5 below.

Figure 3.5 Flow Chart for Determining Protection Settings

The process of
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3.6 Tools
The main tool used in this work is CAPE (Computer-Aided Protection
Engineering software) from Electrocon International [27]. The other tool used in this
work is RTDS (Real Time Digital Simulator).

3.6.1 CAPE
CAPE is a powerful software package used for protection engineering. In CAPE,
the power system circuit (connections, machines, loads, transformers, and breakers) and,
most importantly, the relays and associated protection equipment can be modeled. Figure
3.6 shows a screen shot of the CAPE Database Editor with some of the settings for a
SEL-351S relay.

Figure 3.6 Illustration of Relay Model Details in CAPE
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CAPE has a large database of detailed relay models for commercially available
relays (mechanical and digital). Settings for a specific relay in CAPE are the same
settings as in the actual production relay. One can even download settings from a digital
relay in the field into CAPE, or CAPE relay settings can be uploaded to a digital relay.
Details of the relay performance are so accurate that the CAPE relay model also handles
input values the same way the production relay would.
In CAPE, faults can be placed on the power system at any location and the
resulting fault conditions are reported for any part of the power system. This aids in
studying the power system when a fault is present in order to develop a new protection
scheme or to test a protection scheme.
In this project, CAPE is used for fault analysis on the modeled power system.
From this analysis, the relay settings are determined in order to meet the protection
requirements. The established settings are then used to implement the protection scheme
in order to verify whether the relay settings developed are able to effectively protect the
power system.

3.6.2 RTDS
As a result of a collaborative research effort between Florida State University’s
Center for Advanced Power Systems (CAPS) and Mississippi State University, RTDS is
available for closed-loop or Hardware in the Loop (HITL) testing of the physical relays
used in this adaptive protection research. RTDS is a very powerful simulation tool that
allows external equipment to interact with a software-simulated power system. For
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instance, relays can have current, voltage, and breaker status signals input from the RTDS
and can then output trip and close signals to the RTDS. The relay inputs are real-time
values from the power system simulation and the relay outputs affect the power system
simulation, also in real-time. It is as if the relay is out in a substation monitoring the
actual power system.
The RTDS system is used in this research to verify the performance of the
adaptive protection system.

Verification is accomplished through the real-time

performance of the adaptive protection system as the power system changes and faults
occur on the power system. Figure 3.7 shows the author working on the RTDS and SEL351S testing at CAPS.

Figure 3.7 Picture of Author Working on Closed-Loop Testing of Relay with RTDS
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3.7 Goal
The goal of this research is to demonstrate adaptive protection for a shipboard
power system. This will be accomplished by developing a first generation adaptive
protection scheme, G1-AP, for a ring-bus distribution system. The premise behind G1AP is a protective system that updates settings as the topology of the power system
changes. The settings for the current power system topology are predetermined and
based on examination of the fault analysis results. Additionally, the underlying principle
that enables automatic updating of protection settings as the power system changes will
be verified in closed-loop testing utilizing real-time simulation.

3.8 Summary
In this chapter the need for a First Generation Adaptive Protection scheme was
presented. The power system to be modeled in this project was also introduced, as well
as the modifications made to this system. The methodology for finding the correct relay
settings was presented, along with the primary software used for analysis, CAPE. The
detailed work done is presented in the next chapter.

CHAPTER IV
ADAPTIVE PROTECTION DEVELOPMENT
4.1 Introduction
This chapter details the development of the First Generation Adaptive Protection
(G1-AP) system for shipboard power systems. The two main sections in this chapter
detail the development of a G1-AP system for 1) a two-bus power system and 2) a fourbus power system. The two-bus power system is a straightforward system that introduces
the setting changes needed for the protection to be adaptive. The four-bus power system
is more complicated since it has a looped power system topology. The first section of
this chapter outlines the protection issues and assumptions in this research. It sets the
basis for determining whether the goals of the research are met. The final section of this
chapter describes closed-loop testing of the two-bus power system adaptive protection
scheme.

4.2 Adaptive Protection for Shipboard Power Systems
Adaptive protection is protection for the electrical power system that adjusts to
the changing power system topology. As buses and lines are added or removed from the
existing power infrastructure, the settings of the protective relays may also need to be
changed.
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If the power system topology is fairly static, meaning that changes in the power
system are usually planned far in advance, adjustments to the protection settings can also
be planned and scheduled as the power system changes. However, if the power system
topology is dynamic, as is the case of a ship with automatic power system reconfiguration
capabilities, protection engineers cannot automatically update the settings of power
system protection equipment and keep up with the changing topology. Any delay in
updating the protection settings leaves the power system susceptible to events (faults) that
could be catastrophic, but preventable with the correct protection settings.

4.2.1 Adaptive Relay Elements
For this thesis, the protection settings of interest, which will be updated with
power system changes, are the overcurrent elements, directional elements and time delay
elements of the relay.

The specific indicators of these elements in the SEL-351S

environment are 50P for overcurrent magnitude, DIR for direction and 67P for time delay
in cycles (60 Hz). There are also other settings that are necessary for the relay to operate
correctly, such as the CT and PT ratios, direction elements enable, and line length.
However, only the overcurrent, direction and time delay elements are needed to
demonstrate adaptive protection. Table 4.1 details the possible settings for 50P, DIR and
67P.
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TABLE 4.1 DIRECTION AND TIME DELAY ELEMENTS IN SEL-351S
Element

Settings/Range

Comments

50P

0.25-100 A

Actual current the relay
senses from the secondary of
the CT.

DIR

F, R, N

67P

0-16000.00
cycles

F – Relay monitors Forward,
or into the line and away
from the bus
R – Relay monitors Reverse,
or into the bus and away
from the line
N – Nondirectional, no
direction preference in trip
logic
Timer starts when
overcurrent is sensed and
asserts true (1) when timer
ends.

Levels
Available
50P1P, 50P2P,
50P3P, 50P4P

DIR1, DIR2,
DIR3, DIR4

67P1D, 67P2D,
67P3D, 67P4D

4.2.1.1 Two-Bus Power System Adaptive Elements
For the two-bus power system only the directional elements and time delay
elements are used to develop the adaptive protection system. The reasoning behind using
only these two elements to make the protection adaptive is that as the power system
topology changes, the relay’s position in the protection scheme may change, as well. The
relay could go from being the first relay on a radial feeder to being the last. With those
extremes, the trip delay of the relay would have to adjust to coordinate with the rest of the
feeder and the system. Additionally, the direction of protection could change, depending
again on the power system topology. Figure 4.1 is an illustration of the relays changing
position in the protection scheme as the power system topology is modified. In order for
the relay to pickup a fault and isolate the fault based on direction and time delay, the
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overcurrent element is set to a small value so that any overcurrent magnitude will cause
the relay to trip.

(a) Breaker 1 Open

(b) Breaker 2 Open
Figure 4.1 Two-bus Reconfigurable System
4.2.1.2 Four-bus Power System Adaptive Elements
In the four-bus power system only the overcurrent elements and directional
elements are used to develop the adaptive protection system. However, just the time
delay element is used in the trip equation, since it supervises both the overcurrent and
direction elements [28]. Similar to the two-bus, the relays in the four-bus power system
change position relative to generation and current flow based on the power system
topology. The difficulty in using a time delay arises when the topology is looped and it
makes setting of the time delays for coordination impossible. The solution presented in
this thesis for the four-bus power system is to base relay tripping on overcurrent
magnitude and direction only. With this approach, only the relays closest to the fault will
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trip and there will be no backup. Figure 4.2 illustrates the concept that the closest relays
to the fault will open. Additionally, the other line breakers will not operate because they
are set to not recognize more distant faults. Note that the breakers for each generator will
not operate in this protection model for any fault, since no relays will be controlling
them.

Figure 4.2 Two-bus Reconfigurable System
4.2.2 Updating Relay Settings
The SEL-351S has six different Groups. Each Group has all the elements and
settings required for the relay to protect a given power system. Only one Group can be
active at a time and this Group dictates how the relay will respond to an event on the
system it is monitoring.
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As the power system topology changes, the relay elements 50P, DIR and 67P will
not be changed directly, but rather indirectly. Relay settings for various power system
topologies will be preset into one of the six SEL-351S Groups. When the power system
changes, the correct Group will be selected and active for the new power system.
In simulation, the relay settings are manually changed for the particular power
system topology under test, since the Group feature of the SEL-351S is not modeled in
CAPE. However, when this scheme is implemented using a real SEL-351S in an actual
power system, the opto-isolated inputs of the relay can be programmed to sense the
power system topology and select one of the six Groups for protection.

This

programming is done by setting the logic for the SS1 through SS6 settings, which switch
between active Groups.

Table 4.2 indicates the relay SS setting and the Group it

activates when true.
TABLE 4.2 DEFINITIONS OF RELAY SS SETTINGS FOR SWITCHING ACTIVE GROUP [28]
Relay Setting

Setting Definition

SS1

go to or remain in settings Group 1

SS2

go to or remain in settings Group 2

SS3

go to or remain in settings Group 3

SS4

go to or remain in settings Group 4

SS5

go to or remain in settings Group 5

SS6

go to or remain in settings Group 6

4.2.3 Limitations and Assumptions of Protection Presented
The goal of this research is to demonstrate adaptive protection for power systems,
not to design an all-encompassing protective system. It is assumed that there will be
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other protective devices on the power system to fill in the gaps and create a fullyprotected power system. When it is assumed in the sample models, it will be stated in the
thesis as to what other protection could be in use.
In the case of the four-bus power system, it is assumed that for bus faults, opening
the local and remote breakers of a line connected to this bus is equivalent to opening just
the local breaker. This is a safe assumption because there are no buses or loads between
the local and remote ends of the line and no further outages will occur due to both
breakers being open.

4.2.4 Expectations of Protection
There are expectations for all relays to perform in a certain way for a particular
fault location and specific system configuration. If the relays perform as expected, the
adaptive relaying system for the two-bus and four-bus power system will be verified.
The expectations of the adaptive protection system are listed in Table 4.3.
TABLE 4.3 EXPECTATIONS OF THE ADAPTIVE PROTECTION SYSTEM
1) Relays should only operate for faults in its zone of protection, as defined by the
direction the relay supervises.
2) If both relays sense the fault in their respective zones of protection, the relay with
the shorter time delay (two-bus) or the relay subject to the larger fault current
(four-bus) will trip first.
3) As the power system topology changes, the relays will automatically switch to the
appropriate relay Group for proper power system protection.
4.3 Two-Bus Power System
The two-bus power system is straightforward, with one distribution line between
two buses and either one or both generators online. Figure 4.3 illustrates the two-bus
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power system with both generators online. The naming convention for the buses is done
in a way to quickly visualize where that bus is located. Assuming north is the top most
part of the paper, northwest (NW) is the upper left corner and northeast (NE) is the upper
right corner, hence the NW bus and NE bus. The four-bus system will be introduced
later, but the two additional buses in that system will be the southwest (SW) and
southeast (SE).

Figure 4.3 Two-Bus Power System
4.3.1 Two-Bus Topologies
With only two buses, the possible topologies of this power system are limited to
just three, with two of those topologies being mirror opposites of each other. The three
topologies are 1) both the generator at NW and at NE online, 2) only the generator at NW
online, and 3) only the generator at NE online. This corresponds to three different
system-wide protection schemes.

4.3.2 Two-Bus Fault Analysis
Fault analysis was accomplished by placing a three-phase-to-ground fault (zero
fault impedance) in three different locations on the two-bus power system: the NW bus,
on the line midway between the two buses, and the NE bus. The three-phase fault was
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used because it has the potential to be the most damaging to a power system. The
midline (ML) fault represents a generalization of any fault on the line between the two
buses. The bus faults represent a simplification of any faults outside the zone bounded by
the two relays. This could be a fault on an additional line or load not currently in the
simple two-bus system model. Table 4.4 indicates the results of the three-phase fault on
the two-bus power system in the three fault locations for all three power system
configurations. These results were obtained through simulation in CAPE. Appendix A
contains an example of the CAPE fault report generated for fault analysis. The two-bus
system during fault in the CAPE environment is shown in Figure 4.4.
TABLE 4.4 TWO-BUS FAULT RESULTS
NW Bus
Current
Generator Fault
Bus Voltage
(from NE)
Online (3-phase)
|V|
|I|
∠
∠
NW, NE

NW

NE

NW
ML
NE
NW
ML
NE
NW
ML
NE

0.000
0.248
0.481
0.000
0.248
0.481
0.000
0.000
0.000

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

32759
33779
32759
0
33779
32759
32759
0
0

-90
90
90
0
90
90
-90
0
0

NE Bus
Current
Bus Voltage
(from NW)
|V|
|I|
∠
∠
0.481
0.248
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.481
0.248
0.000

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

32759
33779
32759
0
0
32759
32759
33779
0

90
90
-90
0
0
-90
90
90
0
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Figure 4.4 CAPE Screen Shot During Fault Analysis of Two-Bus System
4.3.3 Two-Bus Relay Settings
As previously indicated, only the direction element (DIR1) and time delay
element (67P1D) of the relay will change when the power system topology changes. The
other settings of the relay are important, but do not change as the power system changes.
These other setting are not discussed here, but are included in Appendix B for reference.
When both generators are online, the relays should be looking forward, towards
the line and each other. Additionally, the time delay is set to zero since there is no
coordination required when the relays are monitoring opposite ends of the same line and
looking towards each other. The first row entry in Table 4.5 summarizes the settings for
both generators online. With these settings, any fault on the line will be isolated to the
line and the generators can stay online. However, with these settings and only two
breakers and relays, faults on the bus will not be isolated. This scenario will be explored
further in the Testing of Protected System sub-section of this chapter, but it is assumed
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that a fault on the bus would be cleared by some bus-protection scheme not implemented
here.
TABLE 4.5 RELAY SETTINGS FOR GIVEN POWER SYSTEM
NW Relay
NE Relay
Generator
Online DIR1 67P1D DIR1 67P1D
[cyc]
[cyc]
NW, NE

F

0

F

0

NW

F

20

R

0

NE

R

0

F

20

When only the NW generator is online, the system becomes radial (one end of
system is the source or generation, the other end is the sink or load). In this case, it is
necessary for the NW relay to look at the line (forward) and the NE relay to look at the
NE bus (reverse).

Therefore, both relays are looking away from the generation.

Coordination is required for this setup so that the NE relay will have the first chance to
clear the fault, and then, if not cleared, the NW relay will clear the fault. To coordinate,
the NW relay is set to have a 20 cycle time delay and the NE relay is set to be
instantaneous. The second row entry in Table 4.5 above summarizes these settings.
Similar to the two-generator topology, faults on buses that have generation (NW
in this case) will not be isolated. It is assumed that there would be bus protection setup to
clear this fault from the power system in a more complete protection model.
The system with only the NE generator online is also radial and the relay settings
and reasoning behind the settings are similar to the case with generation only at the NW
bus, just mirror opposites. These settings are summarized in Table 4.5 above.
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4.3.4 Sort Topologies Based on Relay Settings
There are three possible topologies for the two-bus power system. There are also
three different sets of DIR1/67P1D settings for each relay, one set for each topology
(from Table 4.5). Since there are up to six Groups to be filled on the SEL-351S, three of
those Groups can be used for each of the three sets of DIR1/67P1D settings. Table 4.6, is
an extended version of Table 4.5, also indicating Group numbers for the different
topologies.
TABLE 4.6 RELAY SETTINGS FOR GIVEN POWER SYSTEM WITH GROUPS INDICATED
NW Relay
NE Relay
Generator
Online Direction Time Delay Group Direction Time Delay Group
DIR1
67P1D
DIR1
67P1D
NW, NE

F

0

1

F

0

1

NW

F

20

3

R

0

2

NE

R

0

2

F

20

3

4.3.5 Testing of Protected System
Once the relay settings for the different power system topologies have been
implemented and organized into Groups, the protection system must be tested to
determine if the relays perform as expected. Again, CAPE is used to simulate the faults
and the protection system.
The first system tested was the two generator online system. Faults were placed
at the NW bus, midline (ML), and NE bus to determine the protection responses. The
same faults were used for the topology with only the NW generator online and the
topology with only the NE generator online. Table 4.7 summarizes the results of the
CAPE simulations.
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TABLE 4.7 PROTECTION RESULTS FOR TWO-BUS SYSTEM
NW Relay
NE Relay
Generator
Fault
67P1D
67P1D
Online DIR1
Location
DIR1
[cyc]
[cyc]
NW, NE

NW

NE

F

F

R

0

20

0

F

R

F

0

0

20

Breaker
Tripped

Operation
Expected?

NW

NE

yes

ML

NW, NE

yes

NE

NW

yes

NW

-

yes

ML

NW

yes

NE

NE

yes

NW

NW

yes

ML

NE

yes

NE

-

yes

As Table 4.7 indicates, the protection operated as expected, though the faults were
not necessarily isolated and removed from the power system in all cases. In general,
when there is a breaker and control relay in the path from generation to fault, that fault
can be isolated.
When both generators are online, the protection system cannot isolate a bus fault
on either the NW or NE bus. Instead, the breaker of the bus opposite the faulted bus
trips, removing that generator from contributing to the fault. The generator on the faulted
bus, however, has no relay-breaker combination to remove it from the bus. A more
complete protection system would have bus protection to isolate this faulted bus.
If there were bus protection, some coordination would be required for the SEL351S relays protecting the line so that the bus protection would open all bus breakers,
isolating the fault, before the opposite bus breaker operated on the line. This would allow
the entire line to remain live, through the connection of the unfaulted bus generator.
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When both generators are online, the protection system can isolate any fault on
the line between the two buses. Both relays have delays set the same (0 cycles), but it is
not necessary for both to be equal to isolate the line fault. Both relays are looking along
the line towards each other in this topology. The Group setting for both of these relays is
Group 1 and is described as all generation units online with each relay at a generation
bus. Figure 4.5 is a CAPE screen shot of the protection system isolation a line fault for
this system topology.

Figure 4.5 CAPE Screen Shot of Protection System Isolating a Fault on the Two-Bus
System
When only one generation unit is online, the power system is radial. Only faults
on the generation bus cannot be cleared, all other faults (line faults and not generation bus
faults) can be cleared from the power system. As detailed earlier, there are no relaybreaker combinations in between generator and generator-bus faults in the model
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presented in this research. Therefore, to isolate such a fault, more protection devices
need to be implemented, such as bus protection.
Faults on the non-generation bus in this system will be cleared instantaneously.
In the case of the NW bus being the generation bus, when a fault does occur on the NE
bus, both the NW and NE relays will recognize the fault. However, the NW relay will
wait 20 cycles before tipping the NW breaker, while the NE relay will trip immediately.
After the NE relay clears the fault, the NW relay timer is reset and ready for another
fault.
If a fault on the line were to occur, the NE relay would not realize there was a
fault, but the NW relay would see this fault and start the 20 cycle delay timer. When the
timer expires, the relay trips the breaker and isolates the fault. The amount of time set for
the time delay is not as important for this research as the fact that there is at least some
time delay to coordinate the two relays. The drawback to having the trip delay is that the
generator could sustain great damage from leaving a fault on too long.
The analysis of the topology with the NE bus as the sole generator online is
similar to when just the NW is the generation bus. Everything just applies to the opposite
bus.
Settings for Groups 2 and 3 are for the single unit online topologies. When the
generation unit is at the bus in this radial configuration, the correct local relay settings are
in Group 2. This Group has a 20-cycle time delay and looks forward, onto the line.
When the bus has no generation, the correct local relay settings are in Group 3. This
Group has no time delay and looks reverse, into the bus.
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4.4 Four-Bus Power System
The four-bus power system is more complex than the two-bus power system,
especially when the topology is looped. Figure 4.6 illustrates the four-bus power system
with all four generators online and all four cables connected to corresponding buses. The
naming convention for the buses was described in the two-bus section. Recall, the upper
left bus is the NW (northwest) bus and the upper right bus is the NE (northeast) bus.
Therefore, the lower left bus is the SW (southwest) bus and the lower right bus is the SE
(southeast) bus. The top horizontal cable is the N (north) cable and the lower horizontal
cable is the S (south) cable. Similarly, the right most vertical cable is the E (east) cable
and the left most vertical cable is the W (west) cable.

Figure 4.6 Four-Bus Power System
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4.4.1 Four-Bus Topologies
The topological changes considered for the four-bus power system include
generators online or offline and cables between buses either connected or not connected.
Assuming that there needs to be at least one generator online and it must have at least one
cable connecting it to another bus, there are 209 possible topologies of the power system.
A modified truth table was used to determine these 209 topologies and it is presented in
Appendix C. This modified truth table indicates the topology of the system for different
combination of line(s) and generator(s).
Of the 209 topologies possible in the four-bus power system, 21 of them are
unique. A unique topology refers to a general topology that is different than other
topologies. For example, one generator and bus, connected to another bus through a
single cable, Figure 4.7(a), is unique compared to one generator and bus, connected to
another generator and bus through a single cable, Figure 4.7(b). Whereas, a topology
with the NW generator online connected to just the NE bus, Figure 4.8(a), is not unique
compared to the topology with the SE generator online connected to just the SW bus,
Figure 4.8(b).

(a) One Generator, Two Buses

(b) Two Generator, Two Buses
Figure 4.7 Unique Power System Topologies
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(a) NW Generator and NE Bus

(b) SE Generator and SW Bus
Figure 4.8 Not Unique Power System Topologies
There is so much overlap in the 209 topologies that there are only 21 unique
topologies because of the symmetry of the system. All cables have the same parameters
and all generators share the system equally and have the same characteristics. The next
step is the fault analysis of the 21 unique system topologies for the four-bus power
system.

4.4.2 Four-Bus Fault Analysis
Fault analysis for the four-bus power system is carried out similar to the two-bus
case using CAPE. Faults are place on each line segment, midline, and on each bus that is
active for the topology being studied. This means for the simplest system (two-bus, one
cable) there are only three fault locations, whereas, for the most complex system (fourbus, four cables) there are eight fault locations. Since the four-bus power system relies
on a different protection strategy than the two-bus system, the format for recording data
for faults is also different.
For each fault, the fault current magnitude and direction is recorded for each relay
in the present power system. Additionally, the order in which the relay should trip was

50
recorded. For example, the relay closest to the fault should trip before the next closest
relay. All 21 tables of fault current magnitude, direction, and relay order that were
recorded for the fault analysis of the four-bus power system are in Appendix D.
The fault analysis of the four-bus power system topologies is used to determine
the relay Group settings for system protection. The next section describes the setting of
the relays in the four-bus system.

4.4.3 Four-Bus Relay Settings and Sorting
This section describes the methodology for determining the protection settings for
each relay location in each power system topology.

As previously indicated, the

protection settings used for the four-bus power system include overcurrent magnitude and
fault direction.

Each of the six Groups will have a forward direction setting and

associated fault current magnitude, and a reverse direction setting and associated fault
current magnitude.
From the 21 unique power system topologies, there are 118 possible relay
positions. For example, for all generators online and all cables in service (refer to Figure
4.6 on page 47), one relay position is NW relay A, another relay position is SW relay B.
Additionally, when there are only three generators online, but all of the lines are in
service, NW relay A is yet another position. To fully protect the four-bus power system
for all topologies, all six Groups in the relay must have the settings necessary to be in any
one of the 118 relay positions and have the correct protection settings.
The challenge in grouping the 118 relays into six Groups is that while a certain set
of relays may have similar forward fault current characteristics, the reverse fault current
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characteristics are not necessarily alike. The strategy used for grouping is based on using
ranges of forward fault current and reverse fault current and finding where the forward
ranges are similar and where the reverse ranges are similar.
For each relay position in the four-bus power system topologies, the maximum
forward fault current magnitude the relay encounters is determined and recorded.
Similarly, the third highest forward fault current magnitude the relay encounters is
determined and recorded. If there is no third highest fault current magnitude, then zero is
recorded. The range between the maximum forward fault current and the third highest
fault current is where the overcurrent magnitude must be set for the relay to isolate the
fault.
Note that the third highest forward fault current is used because it increases the
range of the overcurrent magnitude setting.

Expanding this range increases the

probability the overcurrent settings will overlap with other relays and aide in grouping
relay positions into one of six Groups. Using the third highest forward overcurrent
magnitude implies that bus faults may cause not only the local breaker to operate, but
also the remote breaker. As stated earlier, tripping either just the local or both the local
and remote breakers is equivalent in terms of the line being out of service.
Similar analysis is done for each relay position for the reverse fault currents.
However, the range is between the maximum reverse fault current and the second highest
reverse fault current. This is necessary, since including the third highest reverse fault
current in the range would trip breakers on both sides of a bus, isolating it from the
system, despite the fault not being on the bus.
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There are three different relay types: (1) relays that need both a forward and
reverse direction setting, (2) relays that need only a forward direction setting, and (3)
relays that need only a reverse direction setting. Those relays that have only forward or
reverse direction setting requirements do not have to coordinate with a respective reverse
or forward direction setting. The non-existent reverse or forward setting of the relay can
be set to anything since the relay will never see a reverse or forward fault current.
Therefore, the primary and more difficult task is to group the relays that require both
forward and reverse fault current settings first and then, later, determine if the forwardonly or reverse-only relays fit in the already set Groups.
Out of the 118 relay protection locations, 80 of the relays need both forward and
reverse fault current settings. In general, since the reverse fault current ranges are smaller
than the forward fault current ranges, the reverse fault current ranges are sorted first
based on highest minimal fault current and then on highest maximum fault current.
The forward fault current range and reverse fault current range for these 80 sorted
relay scenarios are graphed on forward and reverse fault current graphs, respectively.
These graphs are found in Appendix E. With the graphs, it is easy to graphically group
some of the relays. For example, Group 1 was created by grouping as many reverse
relays as possible into one Group. This was accomplished by drawing a horizontal line
across the graph, intersecting as many reverse overcurrent ranges as possible. This value
was found to be 48 A (relay amperes, also the CT secondary). Then, the graph of
forward fault current ranges is used to find a horizontal line that intersects as many relay
ranges as possible that coincide with the Group 1 found with the reverse fault current
graph. This value turned out to be 38 A.
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Not surprisingly, not all of the forward fault current relays fall into the Group 1
settings. Therefore, Group 2 settings include 48 A for the reverse current faults (same as
Group 1) and a lower forward fault current setting, 1 A, to include the rest of the relays
that need to be in Group 1. This process was continued until all six Groups were used.
The Group settings are in Table 4.8.
Each of the six Groups detailed in Table 4.8 are programmed into every relay at
all eight relay locations in the four-bus power system. Every Group has a forward and
reverse pickup current setting. Note that all of the eight relays have the same settings as a
result of the system having symmetry and each physical relay having an equal chance to
be in any one of the possible relay protection locations in all power system topologies.
The system has symmetry since each generator is identical and would share a quarter of
the load if all four generators were online at the same time. Also, each line is equal in
length and electrical characteristics.
TABLE 4.8 FOUR-BUS GROUP SETTINGS

Group

All Settings Required for a Single Relay Location
Current
Current
Direction
Direction
Pickup
Pickup
DIR1
50P1P
DIR2
50P2P

1

F

38

R

48

2

F

1

R

48

3

F

60

R

48

4

F

60

R

33.5

5

F

60

R

14

6

F

35

R

33.5
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In the next step, an interactive spreadsheet is developed and used to determine the
Group (or, as in most cases, Groups) that has allowable forward and reverse fault current
settings. In the spreadsheet, the Group settings are entered and used to calculate which
Group(s) the relay could use. In the end, if there is more than one Group into which the
relay fits, the lowest numbered Group is used for no other reason than only one Group
could be selected.
With the above described solution for grouping the 118 scenarios, it was found
that eight scenarios did not fit into any of the six Groups. After going back and looking
at the graphs of fault current ranges, it was determined that reducing the minimum
reverse fault current for two of the relays would include these relays in Groups.
However, this comes at a price of tripping both bus breakers for a midline fault, i.e.
removing an unfaulted bus from the rest of the healthy system. In relaying terms, these
two changes sacrifice security (not tripping when not required) for dependability
(tripping when required).
With these two additional relays grouped, there are only six scenarios of the 118
not grouped. Interestingly, all six of these relays are in only one of the topologies: the
topology with only one generator online and all of the lines in service. Since this was the
case, and it is believed that this is the best the grouping method can do, this topology is
not covered in the presented adaptive protection system.

4.4.4 Testing of Protected System
Once all of the Groups have been determined for relays (each relay has the same
Group settings), it is time to test the settings to determine if the settings protect the power
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system as expected. Since CAPE does not model the Group function of the SEL relay,
six separate SEL-351S relays are setup at each relay location, each set with one of the six
Group settings. Depending on the topology being tested, there is only one of the six
relays active for protection at a time. Simulating the protection system in this way saves
the time of changing both 50P1P and 50P2P and is a more organized way of keeping
track of which Group is active for the current power system.
The protection for each topology is tested by placing three-phase-to-ground faults
(zero fault impedance) on each bus and midway through each line of the power system.
Brief results are given in Table 4.9. This table indicates generators online, cables in
service, each relay Group setting and a summary of whether or not operation expectations
were met for each fault for that particular topology. Appendix F contains a detailed table
of the fault results for each power system topology. Note that as the table in Appendix F
indicates, the protection system for each topology and each fault operates as expected
every time.
The design of the adaptive protection system for the four-bus power system is
based on only primary protection. There is no backup protection designed, as was the
case with the time delay coordination in the two-bus power system adaptive protection
scheme. This requires the relays and breakers closest to the fault to act without failure;
otherwise, the fault will not be isolated from the rest of the power system.
As with the two-bus power system, there are some cases where the fault is not
isolated, but the protection system still operates as expected. These cases are bus faults,
with that bus’s generator online and no generator on the connected line(s). In these cases,
the fault current from the local generator will not pass any of the SEL-351S relays. The
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only fault current the local relay(s) will see will be current from other generators, further
down a line. If there is no generator further down, there will be no fault current passing
the local relay and the breaker will not trip.
TABLE 4.9 SHORT SUMMARY OF FOUR-BUS PROTECTION SIMULATION
Group Number
Generators
Online

Cables in
Service

NW
Relay

NE
Relay

A

B

A

B

N
N, E
S, E, N
N, E
S, E, N
N, E, S
N
N, E
N, E, S
N, E
N, E, S
N, E, S
N, E
N, E, S
N, E, S

1
3
3
4
5
4
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA

1
1
1
1
2
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

NA
1
1
1
6
1
NA
1
3
1
3
1
1
3
4

SE
Relay
A

B

SW
Relay
A

B

NA NA NA NA
NA 4 NA NA
2
4
5 NA
NA 4 NA NA
2
6
5 NA
1
4
1 NA
NA
NA NA
NA 1 NA NA
1
1
4 NA
NA 1 NA NA
1
1
4 NA
1
1
1 NA
NA 1 NA NA
1
1
1 NA
1
1
4 NA

Expected
Operation
for All
Faults?

NW
NW
NW
NW, SE
NW, SW
NW, SE
NW, NE
NW, NE
NW, NE
NE
NE
NE, SE
NW, NE, SE
NW, NE, SE
NW, NE, SW
NW, NE, SE,
SW
NW, NE, SE

yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes

N, E, S

1

NA

1

3

1

3

1

NA

yes

N, E, S, W

1

4

1

1

4

1

1

1

yes

NW, SE

N, E, S, W

5

5

1

1

5

5

1

1

yes

NW, NE
NW, NE, SE,
SW

N, E, S, W

4

5

4

5

6

2

6

2

yes

N, E, S, W

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

yes

For the bus fault cases where fault is not isolated, it is expected another form of
protection would isolate the fault, such as bus protection or generator protection. The
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protection model presented here is not designed to be the only protection needed for the
system. Instead, this protection model is designed to demonstrate an adaptive protection
concept.

4.5 Closed-Loop Testing of Two-Bus Adaptive Protection Scheme
As a result of collaboration between Mississippi State University and the Center
for Advanced Power Systems (CAPS) at Florida State University (FSU), the author has
access to a Real Time Digital Simulator (RTDS), in which the two-bus power system
adaptive protection scheme could be tested, closed-loop. In this case, closed-loop testing,
also referred to as Hardware in the Loop (HITL) testing, involves digitally simulating the
power system and providing simulation output to the relays and simulation input from the
relays. With real time input to the simulation and real time output from the simulation,
the relay is able to interact with the simulated power system as if it were placed in an
actual, physical power system.
Using the RTDS and two SEL-351S relays to test the two-bus adaptive protection
system can validate the actual relay operation. The necessity for this type of testing is to
assess the performance of the relays when changing Groups as the power system
topology changes, as this is essential to adaptive protection.
The author and two of his MSU colleagues, Yanfeng Gong and Haibin Wang,
carried out the work completed at CAPS in May 2004.
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4.5.1 RTDS Test Procedure
Complete testing of the relays (both working together at the same time on the
same power system) and the adaptive protection scheme can be accomplished at CAPS,
where the RTDS is located. Using the RTDS, the power system is simulated and the
current and voltage signals and breaker statuses are made available for relay input. The
relays make control decisions and signal to the RTDS to change the status of the
simulated power system (open or close line breakers). This is done in real-time and is
closed-loop testing.

4.5.1.1 RSCAD Model
The two-bus power system is modeled in RSCAD, which is the software user
interface to the RTDS. The transmission lines between buses and between buses and
loads are modeled as cables. The generators are idealized. Additionally, the desired
input and output signals to and from the relay are indicated in this RSCAD Draft file.
The complete RSCAD Draft is too big to show on a standard size piece of paper.
Therefore, it is not presented in the thesis.

4.5.1.2 Analog CT and PT Connections and Scaling
Each relay requires three-phase current signals and three-phase voltage signals at
the location of relay placement in the power system. Traditionally, when the relay is in
service in an actual power system, CT and PT secondaries would provide this information
to the relay’s calibrated input module in terms of 1 or 5 A current signals and 120 V (or
less) voltage signals, respectively. However, the relay is equipped with a low-level test
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interface (behind the relay front panel), whereby the calibrated input module can be
bypassed and the current and voltage signals directly connected to the relay’s processing
module. The low-level test interface requires only low-magnitude AC voltages, as is
summarized in Table 4.10. Therefore, there is no need to amplify the output of the RTDS
to CT and PT levels. Figure 4.9 illustrates the pin configuration of the low-level test
interface.
TABLE 4.10 SEL-351S LOW-LEVEL TEST INTERFACE SCALE FACTORS
Relay Rear Panel
Input
Value

Corresponding LowLevel Test Interface
Input Value

Scale
Factor

5A

5A

100 mV

50.00 A/V

300 V

134 VLN

1313.7 mV

102.00 V/V

Input
Channel

Input Channel
Nominal
Rating

IA, IB, IC
VA, VB, VC

Figure 4.9 SEL-351S Low-Level Test Interface
The voltage and current signals resulting from the power system simulation are
scaled from what is shown in the RSCAD/RunTime screen to the desired level for relay
input. A gain factor is used in the implementation of the CTs and PTs in the power
system model in order to control the magnitude of the input signals to the relay. The
following equation is used in finding the required RTDS CT gain, GCT:
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I RSCAD
× GCT × ni = I relay
1000

(4.1)

where IRSCAD is the primary current seen in RSCAD, ni is the relay CT ratio setting, and
Irelay is the primary current seen by the relay. The RSCAD current is divided by a factor
of 103 because it is in kilo amperes. For the correct scaling, IRSCAD must equal Irelay.
Rearranging (4.1),
GCT =

1000
ni

There is an equation similar to (4.1) for the PT settings.

(4.2)
Rearranging this

equation, similar to (4.2), results in,
G PT =

1000
nv

(4.3)

where GPT is the RTDS PT gain and nv is the relay PT ratio setting. As with the current
gain factor calculations, a factor of 103 is present because the RSCAD voltage is in
kilovolts. The GCT and GPT gain settings are used in the RSCAD model as a multiplier to
the current and voltage signals, respectively, before connection to the FDAC module.
Mapping factors, which set the relationship between the simulated voltage and
current signals and the physical low-level RTDS output signals, are specified in the
FDAC module. These mapping factors set the magnitude of the simulated signals that
will correspond to a 5 V RTDS output signal, which relates to the current and voltage
signals seen by the relay through multiplication of the relay low-level scale factors (50.00
A/V and 102.00 V/V). For the current mapping factor, MI,
M I = S LL −CT × 5V

(4.4)
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Where SLL-CT is the internal relay low-level test interface scaling factor for current
signals and GCT is the RTDS CT gain factor found using (4.2). Similarly, for the voltage
mapping factor, MV,
M V = S LL −PT × 5V

(4.5)

Where SLL-PT is the internal relay low-level test interface scaling factor for voltage
signals and GPT is the RTDS PT gain factor found using (4.3).
Limiters are placed on the CT and PT signal before entering the FDAC modules
so that the RTDS output does not exceed 9 V (peak), since this is the maximum voltage
that can be applied to the SEL-351S low-level test interface.

4.5.1.3 Relay Digital Output
The digital outputs of the relay are signals to open or close the respective line
breaker it controls. Each relay has two outputs: (1) close and (2) open. Therefore, four
digital inputs are needed into the RTDS hardware. These relay outputs are connected to
the RTDS via the 3PC-DOPTO card on the front panel. Figure 4.10 is a photograph of
the connections from the RTDS.

Figure 4.10 Photograph of RTDS Digital Input Connections (Front Panel)

62
The logic of the relay output is the reverse of the RTDS input. Relay logical “1”
results in a closed relay output contact, but the RTDS interprets this closed contact as a
logical “0.” Therefore, the logic is reversed and is taken into consideration by inverting
the relay output control signal in the RSCAD environment, as illustrated in Figure 4.11.

Figure 4.11 Complementing Relay Output Signal in RSCAD for Logic Agreement
4.5.1.4 Relay Digital Input
The three relay digital inputs for each relay indicate: (1) NW generator breaker
status, (2) NE generator breaker status, and (3) the status of the line breaker the particular
relay controls. This requires four breaker status signal outputs from the RTDS. These
four digital signals need a significant AC or DC voltage (110VAC – 120VAC or 30 VDC –
120 VDC) for the relay to recognize a logical “1” for an input. The front High Voltage
Digital Interface Panel on the RDTS is used to provide these relay inputs with a 120 VDC
as the operation voltage. An example of the wiring of this relay input is shown in Figure
4.12.

Figure 4.13 is a photograph of the High Voltage Digital Interface Panel

connections.
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Figure 4.12 Example of Connecting High Voltage Output of RTDS to Relay Input

Figure 4.13 Photograph of High Voltage Digital Interface Panel During Relay Testing
4.5.1.5 Tests Using RTDS
The objective of these tests is to validate the developed adaptive protection
system for a two-bus, two-generator power system through RTDS closed-loop
simulation. After the power system has been modeled and relay connected to the RTDS
as described above, the protection system can be tested.
Testing involves placing faults on the (1) line between the NW and NE buses, (2)
bus-side of the NW relay, and (2) bus-side of the NE relay for each of the three power
system topologies. Table 4.11 specifies the fault location and type of fault for all three
system topology tests. There is no specific reasoning behind choosing a phase-A-toground for the load faults and midline faults, other than a fault was needed for testing.
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The three-phase fault was specifically chosen for the bus fault to minimize all three
phases of bus voltage during the fault and observe how the relay uses this low-magnitude
voltage to do its directional calculations.
TABLE 4.11 SUMMARY OF FAULT LOCATION AND FAULT TYPE FOR RTDS TESTING
System
Configuration

Fault Location

Fault Type

NW & NE
generators online,

NW Load

Phase-A-to-ground

NE Load

Phase-A-to-ground

NW generator online
only, and

Midline

Phase-A-to-ground

NW Bus

Three-phase-to-ground

NE Bus

Three-phase-to-ground

NE generator online
only

4.5.2 RTDS Test Results
Table 4.12 summarizes the results of testing the adaptive protection system with
the RTDS system. Note that a five-cycle time delay was used instead of a zero-cycle
time delay (used in CAPE simulation) due to a concern about coordination issues with
protective equipment used downstream of the final relay applied in this two-bus system
in future implementations of this protection system. This five-cycle delay only slows the
reaction of the fastest relay and should have no other affect on the protection system. As
the table indicates, all of the faults proved to result in expected relay behavior.
Additionally, the relay successfully changed Groups as the power system topology
changed with the generators going online and offline. All transitions from one power
system topology to another were tested and the relays successfully changed to the correct
Group in all cases. A duplicate of Table 4.12 is in Appendix G with an added Comments
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column, highlighting some points indicating how the expectations of the adaptive
protection system were met. Figure 4.14 is a photograph of the two SEL-351S relays
connected to the RTDS system, ready for testing.
TABLE 4.12 SUMMARY OF ADAPTIVE PROTECTION TESTING RESULTS
NW Relay
NE Relay
Generator
67P1D
67P1D
Fault
Breaker
Expected
DIR
DIR
Online
[cyc]
[cyc]
Location Tripped Operation?
(Group #)
Time
Time
Direction
Direction
Delay
Delay
NW load
NE
yes
NW bus
NE
yes
NW & NE
F
5
F
5
midline NW & NE
yes
(Group 1)
NE load
NW
yes
NE bus
NW
yes
NW load
yes
NW bus
yes
NW
F
20
R
5
midline
NW
yes
(Group 2)
NE load
NE
yes
NE bus
NE
yes
NW load
NW
yes
NW bus
NW
yes
NE
R
5
F
20
midline
NE
yes
(Group 3)
NE load
yes
NE bus
yes
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Figure 4.15 Photo of RTDS and Two SEL-351S Relays Connected for Closed-Loop
Testing
4.6 Summary
In this chapter, the method behind the adaptive protection system in this thesis is
presented, along with the limitations and expectations of this protection scheme. Both
the two-bus and four-bus power systems are introduced, including topology,
determination of protection settings and results from testing the adaptive protection
system. Finally, this chapter presented the setup and results of closed-loop testing the
two-bus protection system at the Center for Advanced Power Systems at Florida State
University. The next chapter discusses the results of the two-bus and four-bus adaptive
protection simulations and the closed-loop testing of the two-bus adaptive protection
scheme.

CHAPTER V
DISCUSSION OF RESULTS
5.1 Introduction
In Chapter Four, Adaptive Protection Development, results of the two-bus and
four-bus power system adaptive protection simulations are presented.

Additionally,

results of closed-loop testing of the two-bus power system are presented. The results of
all tests indicated the operation of the adaptive protection system was as expected.
However, this does not imply that this protection scheme is superior or that it will satisfy
the needs of the shipboard power system. This chapter discusses the results of all three
sets of tests of the adaptive protection system presented and determines if this adaptive
protection system is a feasible protection system. The questions that need to be answered
in order to indicate whether the adaptive protection system is viable are: (1) can all of the
topologies be protected using six Groups of settings? and (2) can the relays switch
Groups automatically based on the present power system topology?

5.2 Two-Bus Power System Results
The adaptive protection system developed for the two-bus power system proved
to operate as expected in all topologies for all fault locations. Since the topologies of the
power system are few (only three), there were more than enough Groups to easily setup a
protection setting for each topology. A single overcurrent, directional and time delay
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element was used for each relay Group. The two-bus power system adaptive protection
system had backup protection in addition to the primary protection in some power system
topologies. This required coordination of time delays for proper tripping sequence and
isolation of faults.
There were no major problems with the simple two-bus power system adaptive
protection algorithm. It was designed to be a baseline model for understanding the basics
of this adaptive protection scheme and make apparent any obvious problems. The result
was that there were no obvious pitfalls. Therefore, the four-bus power system protection
was developed, as it is more representative of the future shipboard power system.

5.3 Four-Bus Power System Results
Similar to the two-bus power system, the adaptive protection for the four-bus
power system responded as expected in every topology and every fault. However, not all
of the topologies in the four-bus power system could be protected. Specifically, the
looped topology with only one generator online could not be protected. This accounts for
four possible scenarios out of 209 possible topologies that will not be properly protected
with this adaptive protection scheme: (1) only NW generator online, (2) only NE
generator online, (3) only SE generator online, and (4) only SW generator online.
Since there were 21 unique topologies to the four-bus power system, some sorting
of relay settings was required to protect as many topologies as possible.

As just

indicated, all but one of these unique topologies was protected. In order to protect the
other 20 unique topologies, some reduction in protection security was required.

69
Specifically, there are two fault scenarios that will cause an unfaulted bus to be isolated
from the rest of the system.
Finally, to aid in organizing the relay settings and to have all of the settings
grouped, it was assumed that opening both the remote and local breakers of a line was
equivalent to opening just the local breaker. This assumption allowed the overcurrent
setting range of more relays to overlap and be collected in similar Groups.
A difference from the two-bus power system adaptive protection is that the fourbus power system adaptive protection has no backup.

There is not time delay

coordination used in setting the relays. Instead, the four-bus power system protection
relies on primary protection only. This means that the closest relay to the fault must trip
the closest breaker to the fault, otherwise the fault will not be cleared. There is some
backup protection as a result of opening both ends of the line for a fault, since one
relay/breaker may fail and the other could still operate to isolate the fault from the power
system. However, the protection system was not designed that way and should not be
relied on to operate this way.
The overcurrent magnitude settings of the four-bus power system relays came
about based on three-phase faults on all active buses and lines. This is limiting in that
other faults (different location, different type) will cause different fault currents to flow in
the power system. This may lead to relays not recognizing a fault that they should clear.

5.4 Closed-Loop Testing of the Two-Bus Power System
The result of closed-loop testing of the two-bus power system adaptive protection
scheme was successful because the protection operated as expected, exactly as the CAPE
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simulation of the two-bus protection system. With the RTDS testing, the physical relays
were also tested and the Group switching mechanism could be demonstrated. As the
power system topology changed the relay Groups did as well, switching to the correct
protection settings for the present system.
The relay has three inputs: (1) the local breaker it controls, (2) the NW bus tie
breaker, and (3) the NE bus tie breaker. The signals for the bus ties indicate the topology
of the power system through the online/offline status of each generator. While it was
straightforward to connect the relays to the RTDS via the front interface panel of the
RTDS, in a real ship system the connections of signal wires from breaker to relay will be
more difficult. For example, the relay requires at least a 30 VDC logical input to sense the
status of the breaker. If the breaker and relay are on opposite sides of the ship, it is not
practical or desired to have a long stretch of cable with a 30 VDC status signal on it,
connecting the relay to the breaker.
Additionally, the relays this research utilized have only six inputs available for
breaker status. This is enough inputs for the two-bus power system adaptive protection
system, however, the four-bus power system adaptive protection system will require at
least nine breaker status inputs, if not more. The minimum, nine, includes: (1) local
breaker, (2) NW bus tie breaker, (3) NE bus tie breaker, (4) SE bus tie breaker, (5) SW
bus tie breaker, (6) status of N cable, (7) status of E cable, (8) status of S cable, (9) status
of W cable. More inputs would include each breaker on each line, not just the status of
the line. This would increase the number of inputs to twelve, one for each bus tie and one
for each line breaker.
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5.5 Supplementary Discussion Points
There were a few issues that were brought to the author’s attention at the IEEE
Power Engineering Society General Meeting in Denver, CO, in June, 2004 during the
presentation of the preliminary results of the two-bus power system adaptive protection
scheme. First, it was suggested that overcurrent protection may not be good for close
proximity to generators because the fault current will decrease the longer the fault is
present. This is a result of the generator’s electrical characteristics. This is definitely a
problem for this protection scheme, as it relies on overcurrent protection at the generation
bus. If the fault current were to decrease as time went on, the schemes that rely on a time
delay trip would be affected. Depending on how quickly the fault current from the
generator would reduce, the relays that trip instantaneously may also have problems not
recognizing the faults. Further study is needed on the transient response of generators in
the shipboard power system.
Other comments were made about the harsh nature of the shipboard environment:
high humidity and corrosive salts. This makes it difficult when applying terrestrial
protection devices to marine vessels. Indeed, this is a problem and any application of
digital relays to such a demanding environment requires additional study into the
operating conditions of the relay and safeguards that must be implemented. A likely
solution may be the specially designed marine grade digital relays currently on the
market.
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5.6 General Discussion
Though this adaptive protection system was not meant to be a complete protection
system, there are limitations that make it difficult to believe that it would be a reliable
protection system.

Nevertheless, there are some positive aspects of this protection

scheme that can be utilized in some special applications. First, a review to answer the
two questions posed at the beginning of this chapter.

5.6.1 Can All Topologies be Protected?
Protecting all power system topologies with six Groups depends on the size of the
power system. If the power system is small and there are few topologies possible, then
six Groups should be enough to adequately protect the power system. If the power
system is large and there are many potential topologies, including looped topologies, then
six Groups may not be enough.
In the two-bus power system, three Groups are necessary for protecting all of the
possible topologies. The four-bus power system requires use of all six Groups of relay
settings, some additional reduction in protection security, and it still does not protect all
of the power system topologies. Four looped topologies are left totally unprotected in the
four-bus power system case. Hence, with the grouping method used in this thesis, not all
topologies can be protected in every power system case.

5.6.2 Can Groups Automatically Switch Based on Power System Topology?
Whether or not relays can automatically switch Group based on the present power
system topology, again, depends on the size of the power system. In practice, the relay
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can be set up to input breaker statuses of the power system. The changing status of each
breaker can then be used to trigger a Group change. In smaller power systems, there may
be plenty of inputs for the limited number of breakers in the system. However, as the
system grows, the number of breakers will increase and so, too, will the input
requirement of the relay. It will become more and more difficult to accommodate the
power system as it grows. Preprocessing and combing of breaker status signals would
facilitate a larger power system, but only to a limit.
The breaker status signal that the relay uses for Group changes is of a substantial
voltage. It is not practical or desired to have this type of communication medium for
distances across a ship. While it is possible to switch Groups automatically, location
restrictions and input limitations may make the task much more difficult.

5.6.3 Application of Adaptive Protection
Given the limitation of the size of the power system for providing proper
protection settings, the presented adaptive protection system for shipboard power systems
may not be very useful. However, other niche applications may be served better by this
protection scheme. Specifically, the application would need to be a small power system,
or at least a small portion of a larger power system. Also, the physical distance between
the relays and the breakers it must monitor for protection adaptation must be physically
close if the relay inputs are limited, as described in this thesis.
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5.7 Summary
In this chapter, a discussion of adaptive protection testing results was presented.
The two-bus and four-bus power system protection simulations with CAPE were
discussed, as were the results from the RTDS closed-loop testing of the two-bus power
system adaptive protection scheme. Supplementary comments were made about the
limitation of the presented relays and limitations of overcurrent relays as a protection
method for generator buses.
Two questions, regarding the ability of the relays to switch Groups based on the
power system topology, and regarding six Groups providing adequate protection for the
power system were answered. Finally, potential, general applications of the presented
adaptive protection scheme were acknowledged. The next chapter outlines future work
in the area of adaptive protection for shipboard power systems.

CHAPTER VI
CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
6.1 General Conclusions
The goal of the thesis was to introduce a first generation adaptive protection
scheme for shipboard power systems. This goal was met, as suggested by the results
presented in this thesis. The need for a flexible protection scheme for shipboard power
systems is substantiated by the new development of all-electric naval vessels that require
high levels of fight-through and survivability. Shipboard power systems are similar to
terrestrial power systems in some aspects and very different in others. Special attention
must be paid when designing a protection scheme for a shipboard power system.
Power system protection is important in order to keep the power system operating
as ideally as possible by removing damaging system conditions, such as faults.
Protection requirements may differ as the power system topology changes. Therefore,
altering the protection settings automatically as the power system reconfigures or changes
will keep the power system better protected.
The first generation adaptive protection scheme is based on knowing all power
systems configurations for fault analysis and the predetermination of protection settings.
The relay settings automatically change to more appropriate values based on the power
system topology. Topological indicators for the relays are the status of the power system
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breakers. The adaptive protection scheme presented in this thesis verifies that adaptive
protection is possible and that it may best be used in special circumstances.

6.2 Benefits of This Work
The work presented in this thesis identifies the need for development of adaptive
protection, introduces a first generation adaptive protection scheme, and lays the
groundwork for future adaptive protection progress. Through design of the protection
scheme, a basic algorithm for determination of the protection settings for two-bus and
looped four-bus power systems was outlined. This algorithm was graphically based and
was shown to be very useful in Grouping as many relay scenarios as possible.
Both the two-bus and four-bus power system adaptive protection systems were
verified through software simulation via CAPE. CAPE was used for the protection
simulation as well as for the fault analysis of both power systems studied. CAPE was a
very useful tool because it had a relay model of the SEL-351S, which is the same
physical relay that is at the MSU Power Systems Laboratory. With this similarity, it was
a straightforward process to implement the adaptive protection settings in the physical
relays for Hardware-in-the-Loop testing with RTDS at the Center for Advanced Power
Systems at Florida State University. Testing of the physical relays was an invaluable
experience where insight was gained into interfacing the relays with the power system.
This thesis will serve as a key reference for future adaptive protection work on
shipboard power systems.
research.

It is a stepping block for imminent adaptive protection

Limitations of the presented system are indicated and point to where

improvements can be made. These limitations include difficultly expanding the power
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system and maintaining complete protection, assumptions made about the shipboard
power system to make it more like a terrestrial power system, and the minimal range of
fault locations and types.

6.3 Future Work
Since this work sets the foundation for adaptive protection for shipboard power
systems, there are a variety of areas where future work can be continued on this project.
First, different baseline systems can be tested. Non-symmetrical power systems would be
a good start. This would be a situation in which not all of the generators are the same and
have different fault condition characteristics. Determining protection settings may prove
to be more tedious, since all of the relay scenarios would have very little overlap. Also,
developing adaptive protection for a more complex looped or meshed power system
would be useful for more realistic representation of power systems. Another power
system modification to test is a bigger power system with more buses making up the
loop. Adaptive protection may have a niche application in smaller sections of larger
power systems or just in critical transmission paths. In that case, there is potential in
exploring small-scale adaptive protection on larger power systems.
Besides different power systems to test, alternate fault types and locations would
be useful as well.

A more detailed fault portfolio may find other obstacles for

implementing this type of adaptive protection scheme.
Finally, investigating alternate relaying strategies might make adaptive protection
more viable.

For instance, since the shipboard power system has size restrictions,

differential relaying is a possibility. Automating the algorithm introduced in this thesis
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for finding the protection settings would aid in quickly testing the operation of adaptive
protection schemes on new power system topologies. Finally, using advanced digital
protection controls, real-time calculations could be carried out to find the optimal
protection settings based on power system topology and other factors, such as weather
conditions, historical data, and imminent power system danger.
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APPENDIX A
EXAMPLE OF CAPE FAULT REPORT GENERATED FOR FAULT
ANALYSIS

82

83
Example System is the four-bus system with all generators online, all lines in service
(looped topology) and a three-phase to ground fault (zero fault impedance) at the SE bus.
System Simulator - BUS FAULT SIMULATION
--------------------------------------Currently active NCs
Midline node on "8 Bus SE" to "7 Bus SW" Ckt 1 ; Auto_Clear_Change is ON
"999001 Bus SE" (NEWBUS1) distant 0.500 from "8 Bus SE"
Open breaker on "8 Bus SE" to "7 Bus SW" Ckt 1
at "8 Bus SE"; New bus "999002 Bus SE" (NEWBUS2)
Open breaker on "7 Bus SW" to "8 Bus SE" Ckt 1
at "7 Bus SW"; New bus "999003 Bus SW" (NEWBUS3)
No network changes previously stored
Fault at bus 8
Checking Area center bus 8
************************************************************************
********
Fault 1 of 1:
THREE_PHASE at bus "8 Bus SE"
Simulation Area Definition
-------------------------Center_Bus "8 Bus SE"
Simulation_Depth 1
Mutual_Depth 0
Skip_Over_XFMR_Sim OFF
Skip_Over_Bus_Tie_Sim ON
CTI Definition TB_LZOP - TP_LZOP Desired CTI 0.3 seconds
Pilots ON (pilot flags ignored) Show_Infinite_Times OFF (omit idle LZOPS and
elements)
Element_Code AUX DIR DIST IOC TIMER TOC VOLT
LZOP_Type LINE MISC
AND_Limit_Relays_By X
AND_Limit_Elements_By X
AND_Limit_Fuses_By X
AND_Limit_Reclosers_By X
AND_Limit_LZOPS_By X
Check_By Simulation: open breakers in successive steps
Simulation statistics:
line lzop
8 relays; 0 fuses; 0 reclosers
8 distinct lzops
992 relay/fuse/recloser elements; 3000 allowed
*** Bus fault: all LZOPS are PRIMARY ***
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Simulation area ready
*** Starting event # 1
Fault 1 of 1:
THREE_PHASE at bus "8 Bus SE"
Starting simulation; predicting LZOP tripping times
Tripping predicted at
0.2 cyc 0.003 sec
Simulation to breaker operation # 1
----------------------------------Restarting simulation after predicting LZOP times
Event 1: opening breaker at
0.2 cyc 0.003 sec
Primary LZOP: 8 SW_TO_SE_A at SouthWest; 3-pole
LZOP 0.003; Breaker 0.000; LZOP+Bkr 0.003 sec
Trip path 67P1T SW to SE Relay (G1)
43 TIMER 67P1D
1
0.003 sec from start
Simultaneous trip of Primary LZOP: 3 NE_TO_SE_B at NorthEast; 3-pole
LZOP 0.003; Fastest breaker 0.000; LZOP+Bkr 0.003
Slowest breaker 0.000; LZOP+Bkr 0.003 sec
Trip path 67P1T NE to SE Relay (G1)
11 TIMER 67P1D
0.003 sec from start
Simultaneous trip of Primary LZOP: 5 SE_TO_NE_B at SouthEast; 3-pole
LZOP 0.003; Fastest breaker 0.000; LZOP+Bkr 0.003
Slowest breaker 0.000; LZOP+Bkr 0.003 sec
Trip path 67P2T SE to NE Relay (G1)
25 TIMER 67P2D
0.003 sec from start
Simultaneous trip of Primary LZOP: 6 SE_TO_SW_A at SouthEast; 3-pole
LZOP 0.003; Fastest breaker 0.000; LZOP+Bkr 0.003
Slowest breaker 0.000; LZOP+Bkr 0.003 sec
Trip path 67P2T SE to SW Relay (G1)
31 TIMER 67P2D
1
0.003 sec from start
Backup LZOP: None available
Desired CTI: 0.300 seconds
TP_LZOP
LZOP Summary Report
-------------------

Available CTI: infinite (no backup) TB_LZOP -

1

1
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LZOP Operating Times (s) predicted at 0.003 seconds from start:
Substation ID
LZOP
Name
Type
P/B Trip Path
LZOP
Breaker Total
-------------------- ------------------------------ --------- ------- -------------------- ------- -----------NorthEast
3 NE_TO_SE_B
LINE
Primary 67P1T
0.003
0.000 0.003 Asserts in event 1 3-ph
SouthEast
6 SE_TO_SW_A
LINE
Primary 67P2T
0.003
0.000 0.003 Asserts in event 1 3-ph
SouthWest
8 SW_TO_SE_A
LINE
Primary 67P1T
0.003 0.000 0.003 Asserts in event 1 3-ph
SouthEast
5 SE_TO_NE_B
LINE
Primary 67P2T
0.003
0.000 0.003 Asserts in event 1 3-ph
Logical breakers for all LZOPS asserted in this step:
LZOP
Breaker type & location
Bkr op cyc
Tripped by
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------3 LINE PRIMARY LINE Branch "4 Bus NE" to "8 Bus SE" Ckt 1
0.0
Opened 3-pole FOUR_BUS_LOGIC
5 LINE PRIMARY LINE Branch "8 Bus SE" to "4 Bus NE" Ckt 1
0.0
Opened 3-pole FOUR_BUS_LOGIC
6 LINE PRIMARY LINE Branch "8 Bus SE" to "7 Bus SW" Ckt 1
0.0
Opened 3-pole FOUR_BUS_LOGIC
8 LINE PRIMARY LINE Branch "7 Bus SW" to "8 Bus SE" Ckt 1
0.0
Opened 3-pole FOUR_BUS_LOGIC
Network changes now in effect:
Open breaker on "4 Bus NE" to "8 Bus SE" Ckt 1
at "4 Bus NE"; New bus "999001 Bus NE" (NEWBUS1)
Open breaker on "8 Bus SE" to "4 Bus NE" Ckt 1
at "8 Bus SE"; New bus "999002 Bus SE" (NEWBUS2)
Open breaker on "8 Bus SE" to "7 Bus SW" Ckt 1
at "8 Bus SE"; New bus "999003 Bus SE" (NEWBUS3)
Open breaker on "7 Bus SW" to "8 Bus SE" Ckt 1
at "7 Bus SW"; New bus "999004 Bus SW" (NEWBUS4)
Fault command:
APPLY_FAULT THREE_PHASE 8 X
Event 1: Fault is not cleared after

0.2 cyc 0.003 sec

APPENDIX B
EXAMPLE OF ALL SETTINGS USED IN RELAY GROUPS
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Example relay is the relay protecting the W line at the SW bus.
Device Information:
Device Type: RELAY
Substation ID: SouthWest
Device Name: SW to NW Relay (G1)
LZOP Name: SW_TO_NW_B
LZOP Rank: 1
Style: SEL-351S_5A
Protection Scheme:
Relay Taps: (settings that dictate what the relay should do)
5
CTR
400
6
CTRN
1
7
PTR
200
8
PTRS
1
9
Z1MAG
0.2969
10
Z1ANG
81.95
11
Z0MAG
0.4849
12
Z0ANG
83.75
13
LL
100
14
E50P
2
21
E51Q
Y
22
E32
AUTO
36
50P1P
38 (varies depending on Group)
37
50P2P
48 (varies depending on Group)
42
67P1D
0
43
67P2D
0
128
DIR1
F
129
DIR2
R
132
ORDER
QVI
IOC Element Settings: (variables that are used in the trip equation)
Element Designation: 50P1
Pickup Tap: 0.25
Logic Code:
50P1
CT Ratio:
400
Contact Status:
CT Connection: Y
Element Designation: 50P2
Logic Code:
50P2
Contact Status:

Pickup Tap: 0.25
CT Ratio:
400
CT Connection: Y

Element Designation: 67P1D
Logic Code:
67P1T
Timer Setting:
0.0 C

Unit Number: 1
Contact Status:
Parent Tag: 0
Parent Designation:
Parent Code:
Parent Zone No:

Element Designation: 67P2D
Logic Code:
67P2T
Timer Setting:
0.0 C

Unit Number: 1
Contact Status:
Parent Tag: 0
Parent Designation:
Parent Code:
Parent Zone No:

APPENDIX C
MODIFIED TRUTH TABLE FOR DETERMINING THE NUMBER OF
POSSIBLE TOPOLOGIES OF THE FOUR-BUS POWER SYSTEM
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C.1 Explanation of Table C.1
The left hand column of Table C.1 indicates what generator is online. The top
row of Table C.1 indicates what line section is in service. Entries with “NA” indicate
that the online generator(s) and available line(s) do not create a realistic power system.
For instance, a line might connect two buses without generation and the online generator
may be on an isolated bus.
The combinations of generator(s) and line(s) that makeup actual power systems
are indicated with some combination of a generator (“ 0 ”), a line (“ - ”), and a bus (“ | ”).
The combination of “ 0, ” “ -, ” and “ | ” identify what the topology of the system is. For
example, a two-bus, one-generator topology (Figure C.1) is given by “0-|.” Another
example, a two-bus, two-generator system (Figure C.2) is given by “0-0.”

Figure C.1 Two-Bus, One-Generator Topology

Figure C.2 Two-Bus, One-Generator Topology
A final example is a looped system. Looped systems are indicated by a “ - ”
beginning and ending the character combination. Figure C.3, illustrates a four-bus, two-
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generator topology, with generators only one line length away from each other. The
character combination that represents this is “-0-0-|-|-.”

Figure C.3 Two-Bus, One-Generator Topology

APPENDIX D
TABLES OF FAULT CURRENT MAGNITUDE, DIRECTION, AND
RELAY TRIPPING ORDER FROM FAULT ANALYSIS OF THE FOURBUS POWER SYSTEM
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TABLE D.1 FAULT CURRENT DATA FOR 0-| TOPOLOGY

94
TABLE D.2 FAULT CURRENT DATA FOR 0-|-| TOPOLOGY

95
TABLE D.3 FAULT CURRENT DATA FOR 0-|-|-| TOPOLOGY

96
TABLE D.4 FAULT CURRENT DATA FOR 0-|-0 TOPOLOGY

97
TABLE D.5 FAULT CURRENT DATA FOR 0-|-|-0 TOPOLOGY

98
TABLE D.6 FAULT CURRENT DATA FOR 0-|-0-| TOPOLOGY

99
TABLE D.7 FAULT CURRENT DATA FOR 0-0 TOPOLOGY

100
TABLE D.8 FAULT CURRENT DATA FOR 0-0-| TOPOLOGY

101
TABLE D.9 FAULT CURRENT DATA FOR 0-0-|-| TOPOLOGY

102
TABLE D.10 FAULT CURRENT DATA FOR |-0-| TOPOLOGY

103
TABLE D.11 FAULT CURRENT DATA FOR |-0-|-| TOPOLOGY

104
TABLE D.12 FAULT CURRENT DATA FOR |-0-0-| TOPOLOGY

105
TABLE D.13 FAULT CURRENT DATA FOR 0-0-0 TOPOLOGY

106
TABLE D.14 FAULT CURRENT DATA FOR 0-0-0-| TOPOLOGY

107
TABLE D.15 FAULT CURRENT DATA FOR 0-0-|-0 TOPOLOGY

108
TABLE D.16 FAULT CURRENT DATA FOR 0-0-0-0 TOPOLOGY

109
TABLE D.17 FAULT CURRENT DATA FOR -0-0-0-|- TOPOLOGY

110
TABLE D.18 FAULT CURRENT DATA FOR -0-|-0-|- TOPOLOGY

111
TABLE D.19 FAULT CURRENT DATA FOR -0-0-|-|- TOPOLOGY

112
TABLE D.20 FAULT CURRENT DATA FOR -0-|-|-|- TOPOLOGY

113
TABLE D.21 FAULT CURRENT DATA FOR -0-0-0-0- TOPOLOGY
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D.1 Explanation of Tables D.1 Through D.21
The left hand column of the Tables indicates the fault location, either midline or
bus fault. All faults are three-phase-to-ground. Top row of the Tables indicates the zone
of the power system (NW, NE, SE, SW) and the second row indicates the relay viewing
the fault. The left column of each relay indicates if the relay should trip (“T”), the order
it should trip (“1” for first, “2” for second, etc.), and the direction the fault current will
flow relative to the relay position (“F” forward on to line, “R” on to bus, or “N” no
current flows past relay for fault). Therefore, “T2R” indicates that the relay should trip
second and the fault will be reverse, or the bus side of the relay.
The shading is actually in different colors and its purpose was to aid in quickly
identifying (1) fault direction and (2) the largest magnitude forward and reverse fault
currents for each relay. Additionally, the bold bordered cells indicated the third highest
forward fault current and the second highest reverse fault current, if applicable.
The right column under each relay indicates the fault current in amperes,
referenced to the power system, not the relay. The very top cell/row of the Tables
indicate the character combination of the power system (see Appendix C) and a number
in parentheses. This number was used for keeping track of the different topologies in the
power system analysis. Cells that have a diagonal line through them signify the specific
relay was not part of that power system topology.
Finally, for each fault location, the rows in that section are arranged sequentially.
The first relay to trip is at the top and the last relay to trip is on the bottom of the section.
Four-bus fault analysis was done for all possible unique power system topologies.
The NW and NE buses were the primary buses. This means the first two buses of any
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unique topology were the NW and NE buses. If a third bus was needed, the SE bus was
added. For a fourth bus, the SW bus was added on to the SE bus.

APPENDIX E
GRAPHS OF SORTED FORWARD AND REVERSE FAULT CURRENT
RANGES
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E.1 Explanation of Graphs
Along the x-axis of each graph above is the relay position or scenario in a given
power system topology. Appendix C describes how the character combinations of “ 0 ,”
“ - ,” and “ | ” indicated topology. Additionally, there is one star, “ * ,” in each of the
topologies represented on the x-axis. This star gives the location of the relay in the
power system for that topology.
Figure E.1 is a graph of the sorted reverse overcurrent magnitudes, arranged from
largest minimum overcurrent to the smallest minimum overcurrent, and then arranged
from smallest maximum overcurrent to the largest maximum overcurrent. Figure E.2 is a
graph of the sorted forward overcurrent magnitudes, however the sorting is based on the
result of reverse current results in Figure E.1.
Figures E.3 and E.4 are the same as Figures E.1 and E.2, respectively, but they
also indicate the Groups and overcurrent setting of the Groups for each relay. Each
horizontal line represents a Group. If, and only if) a horizontal line crosses a “MAX”
area of one of the relay locations (scenarios), that relay location can be put into the Group
that corresponds to that horizontal line.

APPENDIX F
DETAILED TABLE OF FOUR-BUS PROTECTION RESULTS
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APPENDIX G
DETAILED TABLE OF TWO-BUS PROTECTION RESULTS FROM RTDS
CLOSED-LOOP TESTING
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